Study on Management Ownership， Agency Cost and Accounting Information Quality of Chinese Family Companies by 林波
 
 
学校编码：10384                                分类号      密级        
学    号： 17520090153215                                       UDC      
 
 




博  士  学  位  论  文      
中国家族企业管理层持股、代理成本 
与会计信息质量研究 
Study on Management Ownership， Agency Cost and 
Accounting Information Quality of Chinese Family Companies 
林  波 
指 导 教师 姓 名： 陈 少 华  教 授 
专  业  名  称 ： 会 计 学 
论 文 提 交 日 期 ： 2 0 1 2 年  4 月 
论 文 答 辩 时 间 ： 2 0 1 2 年  5 月 
学 位 授 予 日 期 ： 2 0 1 2 年  5 月 
 
答辩委员会主席：           
评    阅    人：           


































另外，该学位论文为（                            ）课题（组）
的研究成果，获得（               ）课题（组）经费或实验室的













































（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，
于   年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 







                             声明人（签名）： 











































































































































































As the world's leading organization of economic entities, Family businesses are 
very widespread in the world and occupy the important position in the economic 
sphere. With the launch of the Small-medium-sized board and GEM, large numbers of 
family companies have listed and played the increasing influence in Chinese capital 
market. In recent years，with the trends of the equity socialization and managerial 
professionalization in family business，the family business principal-agent problem 
caused widespread concerns. Managerial ownership, as the solution of the 
principal-agent problem has been an important academic research content. Whether 
managerial ownership plays a role in the family business effectively? According to the 
literature, there are very poor systematic studies about managerial ownership. This 
dissertation aims to deeply study the managerial ownership policy of Chinese listed 
companies, so as to make up deficiency of existing literature to some extent. The 
significance of this research are enhancing understanding the behaviors of family 
businesses and enriching the existing family business and managerial ownership 
policy research. 
Based on related literature and analysis of the unique institutional background 
and the status quo and the characteristics of family listed companies in China, this 
paper empirically tests the differences of the managerial ownership policy to agency 
cost between family listed companies and non-family listed companies using the 
sample of 2007~2010 Chinese A-share listed private companies. Then, this paper 
attempts to explore the impact of management mode on managerial ownership policy 
in family listed companies. Finally, this paper examines the relationship between 
managerial ownership policy and accounting information quality in family business. 
Thus, this paper develops a framework for studying managerial ownership policy of 
Chinese family listed companies, that is, whether family-control and 
professionalization management influence the effect of managerial ownership on 
agency cost, and the managerial ownership policy effect on accounting information 
quality. 
This paper consists of seven chapters. Major contents of each chapter are 
















Chapter 1 is the introduction, which briefly introduces the research background, 
research issues, research ideas and the overall framework, and research improvements 
and innovations. 
Chapter2 is the literature review. In this chapter, the author reviews and 
comments on the literature about the definition of family business, the related theory 
and empirical research on family business and managerial ownership policy. 
Chapter3 analyses the unique institutional background in China and the status 
quo and the characteristics of Chinese family listed companies. In this chapter, the 
author sums up the course of the development of private firms over the past three 
decades, makes detail statistics of the characteristics of family listed companies, and 
investigates the status quo of listed companies’ managerial ownership policy. 
Chapter 4 whether listed family companies’ managerial ownership helps to 
reduce agency costs. The chapter tests the different effect of family listed companies 
and non-family listed companies’ managerial ownership on agency costs. empirical 
studies found that, compared to non-family business, the role of family listed 
companies’ managerial ownership on agency costs is weak. 
Chapter 5 further tests the different effect of managerial ownership on agency 
costs between different family governance models. The empirical study found that, 
compared to family management business, managerial ownership of family 
companies that choose professional management mode plays stronger role. 
Chapter 6 trying to in-depth explore the differences between family and 
non-family companies' accounting information quality, and find out that management 
holding will help improve the quality of accounting information of the family 
business. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the research findings and draws conclusions, shows the 
research implications, and points out the research limitations and the direction for 
further research. 
The main conclusions of this article are as follows: 
Firstly, family listed companies are very widespread in Chinese capital markets, 
and shows significant features in the industry and geographical distribution, the 
structure of control right and internal governance structure.  
Second, confirming compared to non-family private listed companies, agency 
costs of family listed companies is lower. 















agency costs. But compared to non-family business, the level of management 
ownership of the family business is less effective reduction of agency costs. This is 
mainly specific to the family business governance mechanisms, such as the actual 
control of the people directly involved in the management，the low degree of 
separation of two rights and altruism, to some extent replaced the role of formal 
governance mechanisms. 
Fourth, Professional management mode of family business can reduce agency 
costs. Professional management model will help improve the effect of managerial 
ownership on agency costs. 
Fifth, the second-generation family business management can reduce agency 
costs, second-generation management will help improve the effect of managerial 
ownership on agency costs. 
Sixth, compared to listed companies and non-family, listed family companies 
have higher earnings quality and better information disclosure. Managerial ownership 
helps to improve the quality of information disclosure of the family business, but does 
not significantly reduce the role of discretionary accruals surplus. 
Seventh, the managerial ownership is conducive to family enterprises to improve 
the value of accounting information. 
This research is an exploratory work, and the major improvements and 
innovations are as follows: 
First of all, in the research perspective, this article takes managerial ownership as 
a logical entry point, investigates family business agency costs and the quality of 
accounting information systematically, as well as relationship between managerial 
ownership with agency costs and the quality of accounting information in the family 
business, which enhances understanding of family business behavior and corporate 
governance, provides a new perspective agency problems, the quality of accounting 
information. 
Next, from the content of the study, this article is the first one to test the agency 
costs and the different managerial ownership effect of professional management mode 
in family enterprises, which provides substantive recommendations for family 
business management mode selection. 
Finally, there are some partial innovations in the empirical part. First, test the 
















management in family-managed listed companies. Second, in the study of relationship 
between managerial ownership and accounting information quality research, the 
author makes systematic analysis of three dimensions to explain the accounting 
information quality as follows: earnings quality (discretionary accruals), the 
information disclosure quality (the Shenzhen Stock Exchange information quality 
assessment rating data), the information value relevance (earnings response 
coefficients). 
The implications of this paper lie in two aspects. First, as for the family listed 
companies, they should introduce professional managers appropriately, pay attention 
to high-level incentives and establish a scientific and rational incentives system. At 
the same time, the family companies should also develop the preparation plan of the 
intergenerational transmission as soon as possible to achieve sustainable development. 
Second, as for the government agencies and securities regulators, at the corporate 
level, they should actively guide and regulate the accounting information disclosure 
behavior of listed family companies; at the market level, they should establish the 
credit system of professional managers and improve the market of professional 
managers; at the institutional level , government agencies and regulatory authorities 
should continue to improve the external environment for the family business or a 
wider range of private enterprises, provide policy support and institutional security to 
private companies’ rapid development. 
The limitations of this paper are that the definition of family business is still a 
much-debated problem. Meanwhile，the sample used is limited to private listed 
companies, but have not compared with other shareholder type and cannot verify the 
conclusions of previous studies; this article hasn’t subdivided managerial ownership, 
like family founder shareholding, successor shareholding, professional managers 
shareholding, etc.; the author only takes management expense ratio as a proxy of 
agency cost, which is worthy of more attention in the future. 
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